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Abstract
Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively
little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of
charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay
auction should garner more money than winner-pay auctions. We conduct
ﬁeld experiments to test which sealed bid format, ﬁrst price, second price
or all-pay raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both
the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the ﬁrst price
auction. Our design also allows us to identify diﬀerential participation
as the source of the diﬀerence between existing theory and the ﬁeld. To
conclude, we show that a model of charity auctions augmented by an
endogenous participation decision predicts the revenue ordering that we
see in the ﬁeld.
1 Introduction
For a period of time after Vickrey’s (1961) seminal contribution to the literature,
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem remained the point of departure for most for-
mal discussions of private value auctions, despite mixed empirical evidence from
both the ﬁeld (Laﬀont, 1997) and the experimental lab (Kagel, 1995). As the
recent surveys of Klemperer (1999), Krishna (2002) and others evince, however,
attention has shifted over the last decade or two, toward a fuller characteriza-
tion of those environments in which revenue equivalence is not expected to hold.
One of the most important of these is the case of "price proportional beneﬁts,"
as Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) ﬁrst called them, in which auction losers also
derive some beneﬁt, one that is proportional to either the winner’s bid or, in
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1the more general case, total revenues. The most familiar example of this is
perhaps the charity auction, but the list includes the use of auctions or lotter-
ies to ﬁnance the provision of public goods and some forms of bidder cartels.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) have even extended this framework to
allow for individual-speciﬁc externalities and use it to discuss the sale of nuclear
weapons.
Our immediate concern in this paper is the proposition (Engers and Mc-
Manus, 2002; Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner, 2004) that charities
will do better with "all-pay" than any other form of "winner pay" auction. In
particular, we report on the results of a ﬁeld experiment conducted at local (Ad-
dison County, Vermont) preschools that allow us to estimate the determinants
of individual behavior and total revenue in three sorts of sealed bid auctions, the
ﬁrst price, second price, and all-pay. We ﬁnd that the all-pay does not revenue
dominate the others, and that the principal reason for this is the diﬀerential
eﬀect of auction format on participation, an important practical consideration
in the ﬁeld. To advance theory in light of our experimental results, we also
oﬀer a model of charity auctions that allows for endogenous participation and
show that such a model captures much better the revenue diﬀerences we see in
the ﬁeld.
We are not the ﬁrst to collect experimental data on individual behavior and
total revenue in auctions for charities but there are, as far as we know, no other
studies that compare these three mechanisms in the ﬁeld and allow for non-
participation. For example, Davis et al. (2003) conduct a lab experiment in
which lotteries produce more revenues than English auctions, and ﬁnd that this
result is robust with respect to the distribution of private values, the rate of
return on the local public good or repeated play, consistent with the previous
work of Morgan and Sefton (2000). Inasmuch as lotteries can be viewed as an
ineﬃcient variation of the all-pay mechanism - the bidder who purchases the
most tickets becomes the most probable winner - this is consistent with the
spirit of Engers and McManus (2002) and Goeree at al (2004). Goeree and
Schram (2004) provide more direct support for this result: their experiment,
which relies on altruistic private values induced in the lab, compares the ﬁrst
price, all-pay and lottery mechanisms, and ﬁnds that all-pays revenue dominate
lotteries, and that lotteries revenue dominate ﬁrst price auctions. The diﬀerence
between the Davis et al (2003) or Goeree and Schram (2004) results and ours,
we believe, reﬂects the existence of a more complicated participation calculus
in the ﬁeld. In Orzen (2003), which Goeree and Schram (2004) cite, lotteries
and two variations of the all-pay are compared but, in this experiment, values
are common not private. Last, Isaac and Schneir (2003) use the lab to testbed
features of the silent auction, another format commonly used for charitible fund-
raising.
In the next section, we review a special case of the Engers-McManus model,
with emphasis on the comparative statics of optimal bids and expected revenues
across mechanisms, and discuss some of the possible consequences of endogenous
participation. We describe our experimental protocol in the third section, a
protocol that allows us to collect more than the usual amount of data, not least
2a measure of private value, on all potential (that is, active and inactive) bidders.
The fourth section summarizes the ﬁeld data and reports our estimatesof various
revenue and bid functions. We conclude in the ﬁfth section by highlighting the
importance of participation both as a practical matter by estimating the lost
revenues associated with each auction format due to reduced participation, and
as a theoretical matter by integrating a number of recent models.
2 Expected Auction Outcomes and Economet-
ric Speciﬁcations
It should come as no surprise that the predictions of either the Engers and Mc-
Manus (2002) or Goeree et al (2004) models should be diﬃcult to substantiate
outside the experimental lab: both assume that private values can be mod-
elled as independent draws from some common distribution function, that the
number of active bidders is predetermined and known to all, and that each of
these otherwise identical bidders is risk neutral. In addition to the revenue pro-
portional beneﬁts that accrue to all the bidders, Engers and McManus (2002)
allow winners to experience an additional "warm glow" (Andreoni, 1989), with
minimal consequences.
To understand some of the possible econometric implications, consider the
special case in which private values are drawn from a uniform distribution over
the interval [0,¯ v],a n da l lN bidders receive a beneﬁt 0 ≤ α<1 for each
dollar of revenue. It is then not diﬃcult to show1 that the optimal (symmetric)
bid functions Bk(v), k = F(irst price),S (econd price),A (ll − pay),a n dt h e
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¯ v
1The details of a generalized model are presented in Appendix A.
3In the familiar case where α =0 , bidders in the ﬁrst price shade their bids a
fraction N−1
N beneath their private values, bidders in the second price auction
bid their values, and bidders in the all-pay auction bid a fraction N−1
N sN−1
of their values, where s = v
¯ v is the expected proportion of bidders with lower
values, and revenue equivalence obtains, with Rk = N−1
N+1¯ v for all k.
When there is a public goods aspect to bidding, it is not diﬃcult to see that
as the number of bidders increases, the diﬀerence between expected revenues
in the second and ﬁrst price auctions tends to zero - with a common limit
that is independent of α - but that both produce less revenue than the all-
pay: limN→∞ RF =l i m N→∞ RS =¯ v,b u tlimN→∞ RA = ¯ v
1−α.T h i s r e s u l t , i t
should be added, is robust with respect to the choice of distribution functions.
But should charities be able to count on the "all-pay premium" with ﬁnite,
even small, numbers of bidders? The answer is yes, almost. A little algebra
reveals that in the uniform case, RA will exceed both RS and RF when N ≥
3, no matter what the return on charitable donations. Furthermore, some
experimentation with alternative (but plausible) distributions hints that this low
threshold is not an artifact. No less important, ﬁrst and second price auctions
are not revenue equivalent for ﬁnite N: with small numbers of bidders, charities
should robustly prefer the latter. Existing theory then suggest the following
(conditional) ordering:
RA >R S >R F
for ﬁxed N, α and ¯ v.
An increase in the number of bidders will increase expected revenue under
a l lf o r m a t s-t h a ti s ,dR
k
dN > 0 for all k - but the size of this eﬀect is speciﬁc to
each. On the basis of the above mentioned properties - in particular, the fact
that the ﬁrst price "catches up" to the second price as N increases, but that










This is indeed the case, but numerical methods reveal that in practice, the
derivatives are often close in value.
To incorporate some mechanism-speciﬁc eﬀects into our econometric speciﬁ-
cations, we use a number of interaction variables. The ﬁrst terms in our simple
m o d e lo ft h eo b s e r v e dr e v e n u eRj for object j, for example, would assume the
form:
Rj = β0 +β1APj +β2FPj +β3Nj +β4(APj ×Nj)+β5(FPj ×Nj)+β6α...+uj
where APj and FP j are format indicators, Nj is the number of bidders, and the
second price auction is the default. In our case, Nj was deﬁned to be the mean,
over all participants, of the expected number of bidders, and not their actual
number, which no one knew at the time bids were made. The ﬁrst, and most
4important, prediction of the model, that RA >R S >R F, then corresponds to
the null:
β1 + β4Nj > 0 >β 2 +β5Nj






dN > 0 becomes the null β3,β 4,
β5 > 0 and β4 >β 5.
An increase in the return on charitable donations will also increase expected
revenues under all three formats (dR
k
dα > 0). However, the magnitiude of this
eﬀect is diﬃcult to order among the three formats and therefore we only include
the baseline eﬀect in our analysis (i.e., β6 > 0).
There are at least four features of the optimal bid functions with important
econometric implications. The ﬁrst is of course the size of the bids themselves.
It is not diﬃcult to show that in the uniform case, BS(v) >B F(v) for all α
and N - the feature is in fact a robust one - and the intuition is the same as it
is in the no spillover case: bidders in ﬁrst-price charity auctions are still able
to shade their bids. To most casual observers, it seems obvious that when all
participants forfeit their bids, bid values will be lower than either winner-pay
format. Obvious, perhaps, but not (quite) correct. For small N and substantial
α, very high value bidders will sometimes bid more in the all-pay than either
of the winner-pays.2 It is nevertheless the case that for almost all bidders in
realistic auctions, the order will be:
BS(v) >B F(v) >B A(v)
with the caveat that as private value v increases, the diﬀerential between BS(v)
or BF(v) and BA(v) narrows. To provide some sense of the numbers, for
N =1 0 , ¯ v =5 0and α =0 .20, the median bidder (v =2 5 )w i l lb i d41.7 in the
second price, 36.8 in the ﬁrst price and just 0.05 in the all-pay, and even for a
bidder whose private value is at the 90th percentile (v =4 5 ), the bids are 45.8,
41.3 and 19.6, respectively.
We know that bids will be monotone functions of private value but the





dv whenever αN > 1 or, in other words, when the number of
bidders exceeds some threshold, but also that the diﬀerence between them
often tends to be small in practice. The response of all-pay bidders is more





dv for small private values, but eventually increases and becomes
larger than both. Given these uncertainties, the second of the features we are
interested in is just dB
k
dv > 0 for all k.
The response of individual bidders to variations in the number of participants
or rivals, the third feature, would seem to oﬀer a straightforward test of the
model, since:















dN tend to zero as
N increases and
dBS(v)
dN =0 . This feature is not speciﬁc to charity auctions,
however: even when the rate of return on charitable donations is zero (α =0 ),
bidders in second price auctions ﬁnd it dominant to bid their values whether
there are one, or one million, other bidders, those in ﬁrst price auctions cannot
aﬀord to shade their bids as much as the number of other bidders rises, while
competition increases the likelihood that those in all-pay auctions will forfeit
their bids.
Last, consistent with intuition, it will be the case that dB
k
dα > 0.T h a t
is, bids will increase with one’s attachment to the charity but the eﬀect varies
across mechanisms, with no deﬁnite size order in either theory or practice.
As the fourth section describes in more detail, we will estimate both partic-
ipation and, conditional on this, bid values, but the latter will resemble:
Bi,j = τ0+τ1APj+τ2FPj+τ3Ni,j+τ4(APj×Ni,j)+τ5(FP j×Ni,j)+τ6vi,j+τ7αi+...+ i,j
where i refers to individuals and j still indexes objects. The ﬁrst feature (that
bids are ordered BS(v) >B F(v) >B A(v)) now corresponds to the null:
0 >τ 2 + τ5Ni,j >τ 1 +τ4Ni,j
and the second (that dB
k






dN ), on the other hand, translates into τ3 =0 , τ3 + τ4 < 0
and τ3+ τ5 > 0 and the fourth (dB
k
dα > 0)i m p l i e sτ7 > 0.
All of this said, the most important of these predictions, both from our
perspective and that of the charities themselves, is the existence of an all-pay
revenue premium. The standard model assumes, however, that the number of
participants N is ﬁxed and known to all, and this was not the case in our ﬁeld
experiments. In particular, not all who attended the fundraisers or, for that
matter, bid on one of the items, chose to bid on all of them. Furthermore,
those who submitted bids did not, and could not, know the number of other
active bidders, and there was wide variation in their estimates of this number.
Potential bidders behaved, in other words, as if there were transactions cost
associated with participation, the eﬀect of which is to endogenzie the number
of active bidders.4
3For bidders with private values close to the maximum,
dBA(v)
dN c a nb ep o s i t i v ef o rs m a l l
N.
4Some of these costs seemed to be common to all three formats, but some did not. On the
one hand, participants needed to wait until the end of the fundraiser to be told the results,
and those who came with small children sometimes found it diﬃcult to prepare a bid, for
reasons that the next section will make clear. On the other, the rules of the all-pay and, to a
lesser extent, the second price auctions seemed obscure to some bidders, so that the cognitive
costs of submitting a sensible bid diﬀered. Furthermore, at least some potential bidders
6Given the fact that we were unable to detect such a premium - in fact, as the
fourth section details, the all-pay format seemed to impose a "revenue penalty"
- the question is whether or not this is the result of the participation decisions
of individual bidders. The issue is critical not just to charities, but also to ex-
perimentalists because subjects in the ﬁeld can often choose not to participate.
Until recently, however, the theoretical implications of endogenous participation
were not well understood. Building on the previous work of Samuelson (1985)
and Stegeman (1996), Menezes and Monteiro (2000) consider an otherwise stan-
dard private values model in which each bidder knows the number of potential
bidders but must decide whether the expected beneﬁts of participation exceed
some ﬁxed cost. In both the ﬁrst and second price auctions (the all-pay is
not considered) bidders follow a simple cut oﬀ rule: those with private values
below some threshold, the value of which is common to the two mechanisms, do
not participate. Menezes and Monteiro (2000) ﬁnd that under these conditions,
revenue can sometimes decrease as the number of potential bidders rises because
competition also causes the participation threshold to rise. However, they also
ﬁnd that the ﬁrst and second price auctions remain revenue equivalent. We
show, by way of example, that this equivalence extends to the all-pay format.
If, following Goeree et al (2004), the introduction of a spillover eﬀect priv-
iliges the all-pay, but if, following Menezes and Monteiro (2000), revenue equiv-
alence is preserved in the absence of such spillovers, it seems, at ﬁrst blush, that
participation costs cannot explain our ﬁeld data. As the hybrid model we de-
scribe in the ﬁfth section demonstrates, however, this conclusion is premature.
We ﬁnd, in fact, that our data are consistent with the view that charities who
want to maximize the proceeds of their auctions must carefully consider the
relationship between format and participation.
3 Experimental Procedures
We decided to conduct our experiment in the ﬁeld after weighing the costs and
beneﬁts of doing so. One factor that we considered to be a major beneﬁt of
aﬁ e l di m p l e m e n t a t i o ni st h a tw ew e r ea b l et oi d e n t i f yap o p u l a t i o nf o rw h o m
bidding in our auctions would be saliently interpreted as an act of charity. We
decided that examining behavior in this population could ensure the external
validity of our results. Instead of inducing charitable preferences (a la Goeree
and Schram, 2003 and Davis et al, 2003) in traditional lab participants, we
recruited participants who had naturally occurring altruistic preferences for the
beneﬁciaries of our auctions. At the same time, however, relying on naturally
occurring altruistic preferences means that we did not induce valuations for the
items auctioned. At ﬁrst blush, this appears to be a cost of our ﬁeld protocol
because it hinders the analysis of eﬃciency, but we felt this cost would be small
given other features of our procedures that we detail below.
voiced strong feelings about the all-pay format. One such bidder, for example, read the rules,
discussed them with one of us and returned some time later to complain that it seemed to
him a bad (ineﬃcient?) sort of lottery!
7While plenty of auction experiments have been conducted successfully in
the ﬁeld despite the drawback of not knowing bidder valuations (e.g., Lucking-
Reiley, 1999 or List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000), we advance the literature and
partially solve this problem by collecting demographic and attitudinal data from
our participants that provides us with many of the correlates of individual pri-
vate values. For example we asked for two direct measures of their values on
each item they bid and, because the surveyed values were noisy, we also gathered
data on family income as a proxy for a bidder’s private value. We also gathered
information on bidder’s attachment to the preschool including the number of
children years (i.e., the total number of years a bidder’s child or children will be
or have been at the preschool) and recent donations to the preschool as proxies
for α, the public good aspect of revenue.
There are other aspects of our design that we consider to be improvements
over past experiments. In addition to collecting bids, we also had as many of
the attendants of the event as possible ﬁll out our survey, regardless of whether
they bid on items or not. This survey allows us to control for demographic
diﬀerences in our populations that may aﬀect bidding behavior when we test
for diﬀerences in our auction formats. Unlike other auction experiments in the
lab or in the ﬁeld that only collect positive bids, we collected all the bids, even
if they were for $0. We think this is a subtle, but signiﬁcant contribution of
our ﬁeld protocol. Our intuition was that subjects come to the lab "ready to
play" and are, therefore, much less likely to withdraw and not bid in an auction
than they would be outside the lab in a more natural setting.
Together, the bid data and the survey data allow us to directly examine
participation in our auctions. We anticipated that selection and participation
might be important factors that have been neglected to this point. Allowing
participation to be endogenousadds another dimension to the revenue properties
of diﬀerent auction institutions. If one auction type discourages participation
(perhaps because the institution seems complicated or too unfamiliar), and if
the resulting selection of bidders aﬀects the revenue collected in the auction,
then auction formats may aﬀect revenues both through bidding behavior and
through the eﬀects of the institution on participation.
3.1 Our Field Implementation
Each spring, the preschools in Addison County conduct fund-raising festivals.
In the spring of 2003, four of these preschools agreed to augment their festivals
with charity auctions that we conducted. These fund-raisers are traditionally
attended mostly by parents, other family members, and employees and board
members of the schools. This fact implies that the attendees had some altruistic
connection to the school and viewed the money raised by our auction as a public
good beneﬁting their school. Because these auctions were part of the normal
spring fund-raising activities of the schools, we consider our implementation to
be a natural ﬁeld experiment in which the subjects undertook a familiar task
(deﬁned broadly as fund-raising) in a familiar setting and did not necessarily
8know that they where participating in an experiment.5
3.2 Auction Details
We conducted four sealed bid auctions at four diﬀerent preschools in the months
of May and June. The format of the auction was unknown to the participants
before the day of the event. There was one ﬁrst price auction, one second price
auction and two all-pay auctions. We conducted two all-pay auctions because
the ﬁrst price and second price auctions were relatively well attended, but our
ﬁrst all-pay auction fell on a rainy day which reduced attendance. Therefore we
conducted another all-pay auction at a diﬀerent preschool to make the overall
number of bidders in each format more comparable. While we conducted only
four auctions, our sample size, for revenue purposes, is 80 because during each
session we auctioned oﬀ the same 20 items that varied in retail value. Table
1 provides the descriptions and retail values of the 20 items we sold at each
auction. The items vary from children books and games to gift certiﬁcates for
services that parents typically need (auto detailing) or want (a vacation at a
local spa) with retail values varying from $10 to $275.6 We spent considerable
energy deciding on the mix of goods to sell and felt that including variation in
the retail value and the type of good would not only appeal to a wide variety of
bidders, it would also sharpen our subsequent analysis.
The exact procedures we used are as follows. When attendees arrived at
the festival they were given a survey (see Appendix B) to ﬁll out. Completed
surveys were collected at our auction station. When each attendee was ﬁnished
with his or her survey, s(he) was given a “bid kit.” In each bid kit we placed
a set of instructions for the auction and cards for each of the 20 items (see
Appendix B for an example). Each item was displayed on a table with its
retail value and a full description. Participants typically spent twenty or thirty
minutes inspecting the items and ﬁlling out their bid kits. On each bid card
we asked participants four questions in addition to asking them for their bids.
We asked them whether they would buy the item in a store and how much they
would pay for the item in a store, how much they would bid for the item in a
for proﬁt auction, and the sex of the bidder. The ﬁrst three questions provide
us with information on the individual’s private value for the item. We asked
the participants to ﬁll out each bid card completely, even if they decided to bid
$0 for the item.
As they were completed, bidders turned in their bid kits to one of the auc-
tioneers who matched the bid kit number to the bidder’s survey and gave the
bidder a small slip of paper with the bidder’s identiﬁcation number on it. In
each auction there was a predetermined time at which we stopped accepting
5See Carpenter et al. (2004) for a more detailed discussion of the taxonomy of ﬁeld exper-
iments.
6The potential problem with selling gift certiﬁcates is that these items might have common
value properties. However, we realized that the possibility of a secondary resale market
evolving was extremely small and all the certiﬁcates were for local services that bidders would
have surely formed private values for (e.g., not everyone loves the pizza at our local pizzeria).
9bids. After this time, we privately sorted the bids into twenty piles and deter-
mined the highest (winning) bid for each item. We selected one winning bid at
random in the few cases in which there were ties. This process typically took
half an hour. When all the winning bids were determined, we gathered the
bidders, announced the winner of each item, and collected payments (except in
the all-pay auctions where we collected payments when bidders turned in their
bid kits). Winning bidders wrote checks directly to the preschool beneﬁting
from the auction.
4 Experimental Results
Table 2 presents a comparison of the summary statistics by auction. Revenues
varied from a low of $656 in all-pay auction (2) to a high of $1226 in the ﬁrst
price format. The number of potential participants varied from 15 in all-pay
(1) to 31 in the ﬁrst price auction. We gathered bids from more attendees in
the ﬁrst price and second price auctions than in both all-pay auctions where
participation was more limited. As mentioned above, the turn out for all-pay
(1) led us to conduct all-pay (2) which did draw many more attendees, but as
one can see in Table 2, participation in an auction format is a separate issue
from the number of attendees. As we will explore in more detail later, average
participation rates, deﬁned as the number of potential bidders who actually
submitted a positive bid on a given item, were quite low in the all-pay auctions
(about 14%) compared to the second price (39%) and ﬁrst price (53%) formats.
One last comparison worth highlighting involves the socioeconomic status of
the auction guests; the proportion of participants in the lowest income bracket
was notably higher in all-pay auction (1) (73%) than in any of the other three
auctions.
4.1 Revenue
Returning to Table 1, we now consider the revenue generated by item and
auction. The ﬁrst price auction generated the greatest total revenue ($1226),
followed by all-pay auction (1) ($904), the second price auction ($825), and
lastly, all-pay auction (2) ($656). Revenue comparisons by item further reveal
that the ﬁrst price auction earned the highest revenue (among all four auctions)
for eleven of the twenty items.
To test the notion of revenue equivalence while controlling for confounding
factors, we use ordinary least squares to estimate the determinants of revenue in
Table 3. Robust standard errors are corrected for non-independence of the error
terms within auctions. Column (1) presents a basic revenue model that includes
dummies for auction format (second price is the omitted category), the average
expected number of bidders per item, and retail value and its square. This
simple model explains 54% of the variation in revenue. In accordance with our
hypotheses from section 2, column (2) extends the basic model by incorporating
interactions between auction type and the average expected number of bidders,
10as well as, controls for the demographic characteristics of the bidders and their
average private values.7 The more elaborate speciﬁcation explains more than
60% of the variation in revenue.
The results suggest that when one considers mechanism only, the ﬁrst price
auction revenue-dominates the second price auction, with no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between all-pay and second-price formats.8 However, the signiﬁcance of
both interaction terms in column (2) suggests a diﬀerential impact of bidder
competition by auction type; speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that each additional expected
bidder lowers revenue by $1.58 in the all-pay and $0.22 in the ﬁrst price format,
but increases revenue by $0.83 in the second-price format. Not surprisingly,
the results in the full model suggest a positive and signiﬁcant (non-linear) re-
lationship between revenue per item and retail value; a $1 increase in retail
value generates nearly $0.90 in additional revenue for the seller. Collectively,
the demographic characteristics of bidders play only a minor role in revenue
generation. However, average future child-years at the preschool, as a proxy for
α, does have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on revenue (and the eﬀect is quite large); an
increase by one in the bidders’ average number of future child-years is associated
with an additional $12 in revenue. This supports our expectation that revenue
increases when participants have stronger attachment to the charity.
The model presented in section 2 predicted that revenue would be ordered,
RA >R S >R F, if the auction attendees considered the revenues from our
auction to be a public good. Instead, based on Table 3, we ﬁnd that RF >
RA = RS indicating that charities raise the most revenue by using the ﬁrst
price format and not the all-pay format.9 We also see that while the size
of the bidding population matters, it does not matter in the way predicted by
theory. Instead of the all-pay format taking the most advantage of the behavior






dN ), we ﬁnd
that additional bidders actually reduce the revenue collected in the all-pay and
ﬁrst price auctions.10 However, we do conﬁrm that increasing the number of
expected bidders in the second price auction does not aﬀect revenues. Lastly,
as mentioned in the previous paragraph, we do ﬁnd limited support for the
prediction that revenues will increase in bidders attachment to the charity.11
4.2 Eﬃciency
An advantage of our design is that we collected information on our participant’s
private values (proxied here by the maximum of either the amount one would
7Due to the inclusion of demographic characteristics of the bidders in column (2) and the
desire for comparability across the two models, the six items that earned zero revenue were
excluded from both regressions. Note however, that when these six items are included in the
model without demographic characteristics our results do not qualitatively diﬀer from those
reported in column (1).
8In addition, the all-pay and ﬁrst price point estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
9Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd β2 + β5 > 0, β1 + β4 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and
β2 = β1.
10That is, although β3 > 0 as predicted, we ﬁnd that β4,β 5 < 0.
11Speciﬁcally, β6 is greater than zero for one of our proxies, future child years.
11pay for the item in a store or the amount one would bid for the item in a
non-charity auction) and, therefore, we can discuss the eﬃciency properties of
our three auction formats. A review of our auctions and items suggests that
ﬁrst-price and all-pay auctions are generally more eﬃcient than second price
auctions. Controlling for the expected number of bidders, and the item’s retail
value and its square, a simple probit analysis of the determinants of eﬃciency
conﬁrms this pattern (Table 4). Speciﬁcally, column (1) suggests that compared
to second price auctions, items are 9% more likely to be allocated eﬃciently in
an all-pay auction and 32% more likely to be allocated eﬃciently in a ﬁrst price
auction. Furthermore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on
all-pay and ﬁrst-price are equal (p<0.01), suggesting that ﬁrst price auctions
are the most eﬃcient format. These results are robust to the deletion of the six
all-pay items that garnered no revenues. In this case. column (2) suggests that
the relative eﬃciency of the all-pay mechanism increases but the all-pay is still
signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient than the ﬁrst price auction (p<0.05). Interestingly,
an increase in the average number of expected bidders decreases the probability
that the winner is also the individual with the greatest private value; speciﬁ-
cally, each additional (expected) bidder decreases the probability of an eﬃcient
a u c t i o no u t c o m eb yb e t w e e nt w oa n dt h r e ep e r c e n t .
While the standard deﬁnition of eﬃciency is of allocative interest, an alter-
native measure, based on the proportion of the retail value of the items that is
recovered, might be more important to charities.12 Returning to Table 1, we
see that the ﬁrst price auction recovered 98% of the retail value of the items
we auctioned, while the other three auctions recovered only 66% in the second
price, 72% in the ﬁrst all-pay and 52% in the second all-pay. The ﬁrst price
auction is also more eﬃcient using this more practical measure.
4.3 Bid Functions
Since many observable factors (e.g., auction type, expected number of bidders,
household income, private value) are likely to inﬂuence both the decision to
participate in an auction and one’s bid, it is possible that the unobservable de-
terminants of both outcomes are also related. If so, then the correlation between
the errors in the participation and bid equations will lead to sample selection
bias when the determinants of bid outcomes are estimated for participants only.
However, if the correlation between the two errors is zero, then bid outcomes can
be estimated conditional on participation without concern that sample selection
will bias the coeﬃcients. Using a selection model (Heckman, 1979) in Appendix
C, we ﬁnd that once we control for private valuations, there is no evidence that
the sample of individuals who submit bids is systematically diﬀerent from those
who do not, and thus report separate probit estimates of the determinants of
participation and ordinary least squares estimates of bid value (conditional on
participation).
Table 5 presents the marginal eﬀects from probit estimations of the determi-
12We thank Rob Moir for making this suggestion.
12nants of participation. The model in column (1) incorporates information on
auction type, expected number of bidders, private value (proxied by the maxi-
mum one would pay in a store for the item or the amount one would bid in a
non-charity auction), retail value and its square, and the demographic charac-
teristics of the bidder (i.e., gender, income, future child-years at the preschool,
recent donations to the preschool, and employee/board member status). The
more elaborate model in column (2) adds interactions between auction type and
expected number of bidders. Robust standard errors are corrected for within
bidder correlation in both models. In general, the qualitative results are similar
across the models, so in what follows, we report the results of the more elaborate
model in column (2).
Our key ﬁnding is that auction type has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the decision to
submit a bid; that is, ceteris paribus and relative to second price auctions, bid-
ders are 26% more likely to participate in ﬁrst-price auctions and 15% less likely
to participate in all-pay auctions. We attribute this to the relative familiarity of
the ﬁrst-price mechanism and the uncertainty associated with the less common
second and all-pay formats. Furthermore, as the expected number of bidders
increases, the more likely an individual will bid, but this eﬀect is dampened in
both the all-pay and ﬁrst-price formats (i.e. the interaction terms suggest that
there is a diﬀerential eﬀect of expected bidders by auction-type). In particular,
we ﬁnd that the expectation of one additional bidder increases the probability
of submitting a bid by 0.3% in the ﬁrst-price, 0.4% in the all-pay and 1% in the
second price. Individuals with higher private values, employees, and members
of the school boards are all more likely to participate: an increase of $10 in pri-
vate value is associated with a 2% increase in the likelihood of participation,13
and employees and board members are 21% more likely to participate. The
last eﬀect may be the result of peer pressure.
Lastly we ﬁnd evidence that attachment to the public good plays an im-
portant role in the participation decision. For example, females are 13% more
likely than either males or couples to bid and we speculate that this reﬂects a
stronger attachment (due perhaps to greater exposure) to the preschool. While
a bidder’s previous money donations to the preschool signiﬁcantly decrease the
probability of participation, the small size of the coeﬃcient calls into question
the economic signiﬁcance of this (perhaps) counterintuitive result.14 Bidders
with householdincomes less than $75,000 are almost 10% less likely to partici-
pate (relative to those with incomes greater than $125,000).
Table 6 presents the results of an ordinary least squares estimation of the
determinants of bid value (conditional on participation). Again, column (1)
presents a simple model that incorporates information on auction type, ex-
pected number of bidders, retail value and its square, private value, and the
demographic characteristics of the bidder while the more elaborate model in
column (2) adds interactions between auction type and expected number of
13It is interesting to note that the model presented in Section 5.2 (and Appendix A) predicts
participation will be increasing in both ¯ v and v.
14An alternative interpretation is that previously generous bidders feel “tapped out” and
are less likely to participate in the auction.
13bidders. Robust standard errors are corrected for within bidder correlation in
both models.
The results in column (1) suggest that bids in the all-pay are signiﬁcantly
less than those in second price and even ﬁrst-price auctions (p<0.01). However,
inclusion of the interaction between auction format and expected number of
bidders in column (2) suggests that the negative relationship between all-pay
format and bid value is really due to the strong negative eﬀect that perceived
competition has on one’s bid; taking the baseline and interaction terms together,
we see that each additional expected bidder is associated with a reduction in
one’s bid of $0.19 in the all-pay and $.004 in the ﬁrst-price but an increase in
one’s bid of $0.23 in the second price format. Retail value has a positive eﬀect
on bids (although the relationship is non-linear) suggesting that an increase in
r e t a i lv a l u eb y$ 1i sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha na p p r o x i m a t e$ 0 . 4 0i n c r e a s ei nb i d .F u r -
thermore, even after controlling for retail value, we ﬁnd that bids increase by
$0.21 for every $1 increase in private value. As expected, socioeconomic sta-
tus has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on bid value; members of households with less than
$75,000 annual income submit bids that are about $9 lower than otherwise sim-
ilar bidders from households that earn more than $125,000 yearly (the omitted
category). Lastly, each previous dollar donated to the preschool is associated
w i t ha$ . 0 3i n c r e a s ei nb i d .
Reconciling our empirical and theroetical resulst, we ﬁnd more support for
theory, although not all the hypotheses are supported. Recall that our null
hypothesis is that BS(v) >B F(v) >B A(v). We do ﬁnd that bids are higher
in the ﬁrst price auction than in the all-pay auction (τ2 >τ 1), but we do not
ﬁnd that either all-pay bids or ﬁrst price bids are robustly lower than second
price bids (i.e., τ1 +τ4 will always be negative and τ2 +τ5 will remain negative
for 24 or fewer expected bidders). In addition, only our all-pay bidders react
as theory predicts when considering the size of the bidding population. All-
pay bidders react rationally and reduce their bids as the expected number of
bidders increases and the likelihood that their bids will be forfeited increases
(i.e., τ3 + τ4 < 0). At the same time, however, although second price bidders
are expected to ignore the size of the bidding population, we ﬁnd that they
actually increase their bids when more competition is expected (τ3 > 0)a n d
presumably become more vulnerable to the winner’s curse. Likewise, ﬁrst price
bidders also act contrary to theory and increase the amount that they shade
their bids when more bidders are expected (i.e., τ3 + τ5 < 0). However, the
eﬀect is economically insigniﬁcant, τ3 + τ5 = −0.004. Lastly, we do ﬁnd that
bids are increasing in reported private values (τ6 > 0).
5D i s c u s s i o n
To summarize, we ﬁnd limited support for the standard models of charity auc-
tions oﬀered by Engers and McManus (2002) and Goeree et al. (2004) and our
ﬁeld results are contrary to those generated in the lab with induced altruistic
preferences (e.g., Goeree and Schram, 2003). Instead of generating the most
14revenue, our all-pay auction was revenue dominated by our ﬁrst price auction.
Why might our ﬁeld results diﬀer from theory and the lab? We feel that the
most important aspect of charity auction theory that has been neglected to this
point is participation. In both theory and the lab, participation is essentially
guaranteed.15 As Table 5 indicates, in the real world of fund-raising, partici-
pation is not guaranteed. Based on our casual debrieﬁngs after the auctions,
the results reported in Table 5 make sense. Most participants had never heard
of the all-pay auction format and only a few (those with some internet bidding
experience) had experience in second price auctions. While this is bound to
be true of subjects in the lab, our ﬁeld participants were much more likely to
respond naturally by not participating when the rules seemed too unfamiliar.
5.1 The Revenue Cost of Non-Participation
To get a sense of the cost imposed by the unfamiliarity of the all-pay format,
in terms of reduced participation, consider the following thought experiment.
Imagine that everyone who was given a bid kit participated in every auction
(i.e., they bid on all 20 items). Under these circumstances, how much revenue
would be generated in each of our four auctions? We can use our bid estimates
generated by the sub-sample of positive bids to predict, out of sample, the bids
of non-participants. Based on the bids from the entire population of attendees,
we can re-evaluate the winning bids in the ﬁrst price and second price auctions
and sum the revenue over all the possible bids in the all-pay auctions. When we
do this we ﬁnd the ﬁrst price auction would generate $1329.43, the second price
auction would generate $897.60, and the two all-pay auctions would generate
$3010.66 and $4818.89, respectively. Notice now that the order of revenues
would be: all-pay (1) > all-pay (2) > ﬁrst price > second price which is much
closer to what section 2 predicted. Also notice that the diﬀerence between the
actual revenue and our full-participation revenue is an estimate of the cost of
reduced participation. The cost is negligible in the ﬁrst price auction ($103.43)
and the second price auction ($72.60) but it is quite substantial in the all pay
auctions ($2106.66 and $4162.89, respectively).
5.2 Theoretical Foundations of Participation in Charity
Auctions
Rather than leaving the important issue of participation open, we conclude by
oﬀering a model of charity auctions that allows endogenous participation. As
we will see the resulting model maps much better on to our ﬁeld experimental
results. We consider charity auctions with N ≥ 2 potential risk-neutral bidders
whose private values can be modelled as independent draws from some diﬀer-
entiable distribution function (cdf) F with support [0,¯ v]. Auction revenues
are used to provide some service that beneﬁts all bidders, active or not: as in
15To be sure, lab participants may choose to bid $0, but this sort of non-participation is
almost unheard of.
15Goeree et al. (2004), the value of this beneﬁt to each bidder is assumed to be
af r a c t i o nα ∈ [0,1) of these revenues. At the same time, following Samuel-
son (1985) and Menezes and Monteiro (2000), potential bidders confront some
cost of participation ck ∈ [0,¯ v), k = F(irst), S(econd), A(ll-Pay),t h ev a l u e
of which is allowed to be mechanism-speciﬁc, so that the number of active bid-
ders is not predetermined. While Samuelson [1985] and others have deﬁned
this cost in terms of the resources committed to bid preparation, we believe, on
the basis of our ﬁeld experiments, that a broad(er) deﬁnition, which includes
cognitive diﬃculty of the mechanism or familiarity, is warranted. Within this
framework, our derivation of the optimal symmetric rules for bidders and the
calculation of expected revenues then mimics Engers and McManus (2002), with
one important exception that reﬂects our data: we assume that there is some
participation threshold v ≥ 0.
For the sake of brevity, the full derivation of optimal bids, expected revenues,
and participation thresholds have been relocated in Appendix A. Many of our
results do not depend on the particular distribution of private values that is
assumed, but, as is standard in this literature, we discuss examples where the
distribution is uniform.
In the ﬁrst price auction with warm glow and participation costs, the risk













where v = (cF¯ vN−1)
1
N this collapses to N−1
N v (i.e., the standard shaded bid)
when bidders receive no charitable beneﬁt (α = 0) and there are no participation
costs (v =0 ). The likelihood that a bidder chosen at random will submit such
a bid depends on three factors: the costs of participation cF, the maximum
private value ¯ v, which we interpret as a measure of the overall attractiveness
of the item, and the number of potential bidders N. The ﬁrst two do not
require much comment, but the third, which has important consequences for
the comparative statics of both the optimal bid and expected revenue functions,
does: as the number of potential bidders increases, so, too, does the likelihood
that an active bidder will forfeit her "investment" in the auction, which in turn
causes the participation threshold to rise.
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¯ v when α = v =0 .
What are the empirical implications of charitable bidding and participation
costs? Figure 1(a) illustrates the variation in optimal bids as a function of
private value v and the number of potential bidders N for the case where α =
160.20,c=0 .5 and ¯ v =5 0 . Two particular features stand out. First, despite the
fact that the cost of participation is just 0.5% of mean private value (25), the
non-participation zone, represented as the ﬂoor in Figure 1(b), is substantial.
A potential bidder with a private value of 30, for example, will choose not to
participate when there are just 9 other bidders. Second, and perhaps a little
harder to see, bids ﬁrst rise and then fall as the number of potential bidders
rises (as we found in section 4.3), an important qualiﬁcation to the standard
intuition that bidders in ﬁrst price auctions cannot aﬀord to shade their bids
as much as the number of their rivals increases. Furthermore, what Figure 1
does not show is that while the existence of the "hump" in the bid function is
a consequence of participation costs - it manifests itself, in other words, even
when α = 0 - its location depends on the return to charitable donations: the
smaller the value of α,t h esmaller the critical N.
Along the same lines, we have plotted expected revenue RF as a function
of the number of potential bidders N and participation costs c in Figure 1(b),
for the same benchmark values α =0 .20 and ¯ v =0 .50. Given the response
of individual bidders to an increase in the number of potential competitors the
observation that expected revenue nevertheless rises with N is an important
result. In behavioral terms, the fact that there will be more high value bidders
dominates the decision of more low value bidders not to participate. This is not
inevitable, however: in their no spillover model, Menezes and Monteiro (2002)
provide an example of a cdf of private values that cause revenues to fall.
On the other hand, participation costs do not seem to matter much, despite
their pronounced eﬀects on individual bidders. If N =1 5 , expected revenues
fall from 44.3 when c =0to just 42.9 when c =0 .5. However, even when
participation costs are 20% of the mean private value (c =5 ), expected revenues
still exceed 36.




α¯ v + v
1+α
One important feature of the second price bid rule stands out: neither the
introduction of spillovers nor participation costs causes bidders in second price
auctions to be sensitive to the number of bidders.16
Furthermore, if participation costs in ﬁrst and second price auctions are the
same, the participation thresholds will be, too. To see this, we note that for
the threshold bidder, the diﬀerence between the expected beneﬁts of participa-
tion and non-participation is once more F(v) N−1v − cS, so that bidders will
not be indiﬀerent between them unless F(v)N−1v = cS or, in the uniform case,
v = (cS¯ vN−1)
1
N . In addition, the threshold is the same, mutatis mutandis,i n
16Most readers will recall that without either complication, individuals will ﬁnd it dominant
to bid their values in second-price auctions. Menezes and Monteiro (2002) show that it remains
dominant to do so in the presence of participation costs, and Engers and McManus (2002)
show that the optimal bid is once more independent of N,s ot h a to u rr e s u l tc o m e sa sn o
surprise.
17the all-pay format (see below), which has the important empirical implication
that controlling for diﬀerences in the number of potential bidders and attrac-
tiveness of the item as we have done in Section 5, implies that any diﬀerences
in participation rates must be the result, under the maintained assumptions of
our model, of diﬀerences in participation costs.
The comparative statics of BS(v) are more or less obvious but, for purposes
of comparison, Figure 2(a) is the second price equivalent of Figure 1(a); com-
paring the two reveals, ﬁrst and foremost, that for speciﬁed v and N,b i d si n
the second price auction will exceed those in the ﬁrst price. Given the hump-
shaped response of ﬁrst price bid values to increased competition, this diﬀerence
ﬁrst shrinks and then expands. For ﬁxed N, on the other hand, the diﬀerence
between them is a steadily decreasing function of private value.






















and one of the most important features of this expression is its connection to
the expected revenues in a ﬁrst price auction: in the absence of any spillovers
(that is, α = 0), it is not diﬃcult to show that the two expressions will be equal
if participation costs are the same (cS = cF). This is more or less visible in a
comparison of Figure 2(b). Further comparison reveals that the second price
auction produces more revenue in the absence of participation costs - that is,
when participation is exogenous - than the ﬁrst price, but that this diﬀerence
tends to zero as N tends to ∞. It should be added that in this case, their
common limit value is ¯ v, which is also the limit value when there are (also) no
spillover eﬀects: the "charity premium" is a feature, in other words, of small(er)
auctions.









The characteristics of the all-pay bidding rule, as illustrated in Figures 3(a),
will perhaps surprise some readers. Intuition suggests, for example, that be-
cause bidders must pay their bids, win or lose, bid values should be (much)
smaller, ceteris paribus, than those in ﬁrst or second price auctions. And this
is indeed the case over much of the relevant domain, but as Figure 3(a) reveals,
the same cannot be said about the (very) "high value bidder" faced with a sub-
stantial number of potential rivals: she will sometimes bid more than she would
in either ﬁrst or second price auctions. Figure 3(a) also reveals that bids in the
ﬁrst price and all-pay (but not second price) share an important feature: both
are hump-shaped in the sense that, for speciﬁed v, bids ﬁrst rise, and then fall,
as N rises.
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As alluded to earlier, it can be shown that revenue equivalence holds if there
are no spillovers (α = 0) and participation costs are not mechanism speciﬁc. In
the absence of participation costs, on the other hand, the all-pay format must
(eventually) produce more revenue than either the ﬁrst or second price formats:
it is not diﬃcult to show, for example, following Engers and McManus (2002),
that limN→∞ RF =l i m N→∞ RS =¯ v<limN→∞ RA = 1
1−α¯ v.G o e r e e e t a l
(2004) provide some useful intuition for this result: bidders who top one another
in ﬁrst or second price auctions do not beneﬁt from the positive externality that
their all-pay counterparts do.
Some of these features are evident in Figure 3(b), drawn for the same bench-
mark values (in particular, α =0 .20) as the others: when the costs of partici-
pation are zero, for example, expected revenues exceed the limit value for ﬁrst
and second price auctions (that is, 50) when a tenth potential bidder is added.
Indeed, inasmuch as the eﬀects of participation costs on expected revenues seem
limited, the revenue premium associated with the all-pay format appears to be
robust: if cA =1 , for example, but cF and cS a r eh e l dﬁ x e da t0, RA will still
surpass 50 with the addition of a sixteenth bidder. If cA =2 , on the other
hand, almost 50 potential bidders are needed.
For our current purpose, the most important feature of the model is the fact
that adding mechanism-speciﬁc participation costs makes a strong prediction
about diﬀerences in participation that was not obvious before solving the model.
Given the maintained assumptions of the model, if participation costs are the
same across formats, participation should also be the same. Of course, on the
other side of this coin is the fact that participation diﬀerences can, therefore,
only be caused by substantial diﬀerences in participation costs. Conveniently,
our model also predicts that diﬀerences in participation costs (in the direction
that seems most plausible from our experiment, cA >c S >c F)c a na ﬀ e c tt h e
ordering of revenues. Speciﬁcally, if we maintain α =0 .2, ¯ v =5 0etc., and set
cF =0the model suggests we should expect, RF >R S >R A when cS is as low
as 0.05 and cA =2 .54,w h i c hi sjust 5% of the highest valuation. Given our
participant’s reactions to the diﬀerent formats, such a diﬀerence in participation
costs does not seem unwarranted.
5.3 Concluding Remarks
With this theoretical support for our empirical results, we are more conﬁdent
that our identiﬁcation of endogenous participation as the source of revenue
diﬀerentials in real world charity auctions is the correct one. In particular,
19charities with unsophisticated or inexperienced bidders should be reluctant to
use the all-pay format, despite conventional wisdom, because its costs of partic-
ipation are high. For such charities, the more familiar ﬁrst-price format is the
sensible choice.
6 Appendix A: Derivations of the Theoretical
Results on Participation
Consider auctions with N ≥ 2 potential risk-neutral bidders whose private values
are independent draws from some diﬀerentiable distribution function (cdf) F
with support [0,¯ v]. All bidders beneﬁt by a fraction α ∈ [0,1) of the total
revenue earned by the charity. In addition, potential bidders face a participation
cost, cJ ∈ [0,¯ v), J = F(irst), S(econd), A(ll-Pay), which is mechanism-speciﬁc.
As a result, participants only bid if their value exceeds some threshold, v, and,
therefore, the number of active bidders is endogenous.
6.1 The First Price Auction
The representative bidder in the ﬁrst price auction must decide whether or not
to participate and, if so, what type ￿ v to "announce" or bid BF(￿ v) to submit.
To this end, we shall ﬁrst derive the conditions under which someone with the
private value v ≥ v ﬁnds it optimal to reveal her type when the participation
threshold v is held ﬁxed. With likelihood C
N−1
M F(v)N−1−M(1−F(v))M,w h e r e
C
N−1
M = (N−1)!/(N−1−M)! M!, she will compete with M other active bidders,
and conditional on M ≥ 1, the ﬁrst order statistic of her rivals’ private values
will have the cdf G(x,M)=( F(x) − F(v))M/(1 − F(v))M. The conditional








where g(x,M)=dG(x,M)/dx = M(F(x) − F(v))M−1f(x)/(1 − F(v))M is
the conditional density function (pdf) of the ﬁrst order statistic. The ﬁrst
term in (1) is her return when she wins the auction, and the second is the
"charity" beneﬁt that still accrues to her when she does not. It follows that
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after substitution for G(x,M) and g(x,M), where the ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst
and second lines is the return in the "no other bidder" case, and the third line
follows from the fact that
￿ ￿ v
v g(x,M)=( F(￿ v)−F(v))M/(1−F(v))M and that,




M F(v)N−1−M(F(￿ v) −
F(v))M = F(￿ v)N−1 −F(v)N−1.
The derivative of EU(￿ v,v) with respect to the choice variable ￿ v is therefore:
∂EU(￿ v,v)
∂￿ v
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M MF(v)N−1−M(F(￿ v) − F(v))M−1
= −(1 − α)F(￿ v)N−1dBF
d￿ v
+(N −1)F(￿ v)N−2f(￿ v)(v − (1 −α)BF(￿ v))
−α(N − 1)F(￿ v)N−2f(￿ v)B(￿ v)





F(v))M−1 =( N−1)F(v)N−2. Therelevant ﬁrst order condition, ∂EU(￿ v,v)/∂￿ v =















since F(v)  =0for all v ≥ v. This diﬀerential equation is not exact, but has an
integrating factor, F(v)
N−1




















1−α −1f(v)vdv +k (6)
21where k is a constant of integration.
To calculate k, the boundary condition BF(v)F(v)
N−1
1−α = 0 is imposed,
consistent with the observation that someone whose private value lies on the










1−α −1f(x)xdx + k (7)


































In the special case where there are neither spillovers (α = 0) nor participa-
tion costs (cF =0 , which implies v =0 ), the bid function collapses to the
familiar BF(v)=N−1
N v, in which bids are "shaded" 1/N below private values.
If spillovers (alone) are reintroduced, it becomes BF(v)= N−1
N−αv, consistent
with Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), who ﬁrst showed that BF(v)= 1
2−αv when
there are two bidders, and Goeree et al. (2004). Without spillovers but with










which is equivalent to Menezes and Monteiro’s (2002) result for ﬁrst price auc-
tions.17
Inasmuch as the participation threshold v is endogenous to the model, how-
ever, the optimal bid function (7) is not a reduced form in the usual sense.
To remedy this, we observe that (a) an individual with the threshold private
value should be indiﬀerent between participation (and a zero bid) and non-
participation and (b) the positive spillovers that (sometimes) result from the
decisions of other bidders are not conditional on participation. It follows from
(2), therefore, that v must solve:
17On the basis of their somewhat diﬀerent approach, Menezes and Monteiro (2002) show
that, in terms of our notation:
BF (v)=
￿ v
v (N − 1)xF(x)N−2f(x)dx
F(v)N−1
which simpliﬁes to our (9) when the distribution of values is uniform.
22vF(v)N−1 = cF (11)
Given (b), it comes as no surprise that this threshold is the same as that derived
in Menezes and Monteiro (2002) in the "no spillover case." For a uniform
distribution of private values, (10) implies that v =( cF¯ vN−1)
1
N .
Charities will be less interested in bid values, however, than expected rev-
enues RF.T o c a l c u l a t e RF, we ﬁrst note that if the ﬁrst order statistic for all
N potential bidders, x,i sb e l o wv, no one bids and revenues are zero, but that
if it exceeds v, revenues will be BF(x). Since the pdf for the ﬁrst order statistic





where the threshold value is written v(c,N) as a reminder that the lower limit




















or, after integration and some simpliﬁcation:
RF =
N(N − 1)
(N − α)(N +1)
￿




N(N −1)(1 − α)













where v = (cF¯ vN−1)
1






¯ v, a familiar result. With spillovers, but without participation





¯ v, consistent with Engers
and McManus (2002). It should be noted that when bidders receive such
beneﬁts, revenues increase but that the diﬀerence vanishes as the number of
bidders rises: both expressions tend to ¯ v as N tends to ∞. With participation












(¯ v − v) (15)
6.2 The Second-Price Auction
The derivation of the optimal bid and expected revenue functions in the second
price auction requires the introduction of another cdf J(x,M), the conditional












23as well as the (related) likelihood that a bidder who "announces" type ￿ v is the
runner-up, since the winner then pays BS(￿ v):
M
￿








M(F(￿ v) −F(v))M−1(1 − F(￿ v))
(1 −F(v))M
(17)
Given these preliminaries, we then observe that with likelihood F(v)N−1,t h e
representative bidder will have no active competitors - the "second price" is then
a s s u m e dt ob ez e r o-i nw h i c hc a s es h ew i l lr e c e i v ev no matter what bid BS(￿ v)
she has submitted. As a result, the optimal threshold bid is indeterminate,
which in turn complicates the choice of boundary condition, as discussed below.
With likelihood C
N−1
M F(v)N−1−M(1 − F(v)) M, on the other hand, there will




(v −(1 − α)BS(x))g(x,M)dx (18)
+
M(F(￿ v) − F(v))M−1(1 −F(￿ v))











M(M − 1)(F(x) −F(v))M−2(1 − F(x))f(x)
(1 −F(v))M (19)
is the pdf of the second order statistic. The ﬁrst term is once more the beneﬁt
that accrues to her when she wins - the diﬀerence between (1) and (18) is the
bid is now BS(x) rather than BF(￿ v) - and the third captures the direct spillover
eﬀect when she does not. The second is the indirect eﬀect of her bid on the
winner’s payment when she is the runner-up.









(v −(1 − α)BS(x))(F(x) − F(v)M−1f(x)dx
￿















BS(x)(F(x) −F(v))M−2(1 − F(x))f(x)dx
￿
24Because the partial derivatives of the third and fourth terms with respect to ￿ v
both contain theterm α(1−F(￿ v))BS(￿ v)
￿N−1
M=1CN−1
M M(M−1) F(v)N−1−M(F(￿ v)−
F(v))M−2f(￿ v), the expression for ∂EU(v,￿ v)/∂￿ v collapses to:
∂EU(v,￿ v)
∂￿ v












M MF(v)N−1−M(F(￿ v) −F(v))M−1
=( N − 1)(v −(1 − α)BS(￿ v))F(￿ v)N−2f(￿ v)






Setting ∂EU(v,￿ v)/∂￿ v =0at v = ￿ v and dividing both sides by (N−1)F(￿ v)N−2 ￿=





































α + k (25)
where k is the constant of integration.
The choice of boundary condition, and therefore the calculation of k,i sc o m -
plicated for two reasons. The optimal threshold bid BS(v) is, as noted above,
indeterminate, but the derivation of (23) assumed that v ￿= ¯ v. The second
p r o b l e mc a nb ec i r c u m v e n t e d ,h o w e v e r ,i ft h et h ed o m a i no f(1−F(v))
1
αBS(v)
is (re)extended to ¯ v such that (1 − F(¯ v))
1
αBS(¯ v) assumes its limit value of 0.











Integration by parts then implies:























where the limit bids BS(v) and BS(¯ v) a r ec h o s e ns ot h a tBS(v) is continuous
over [v,¯ v].
When the distribution of private values is uniform, the optimal second-price
bid is a simple linear function of private value:
BS(v)=
α¯ v + v
1+α
(29)
Except for the domain restriction - individuals with private values below the
threshold do not bid at all - this is the same function obtained in Goeree et al
(2004) and Engers and McManus (2002).
It is the second order statistic of private values, with unconditional pdf





















where the separation of terms allows the spillover eﬀect to be isolated. Evalu-























where, of course, v = (cS¯ vN−1)
1
N.
6.3 The All-Pay Auction
The derivation of the optimal bid under the all-pay mechanism follows now fa-
miliar lines. With probability F(v)N−1, the representative bidder will have no
other rivals, and can expect (v−(1−α)B(￿ v)). With probability C
N−1
M F(v)N−1−M(1−









f(x)BA(x)dx − (1 −α)BA(￿ v)
(33)
The ﬁrst term term reﬂects the fact that the bidder receives her private value v
if she wins the auction, while the second and third follow from the observation
that, win or lose, she loses the (net) cost of her bid (1 − α)BA(￿ v) but receives
a beneﬁt equal to a fraction of α of the sum of the other bids, expressed here
as a fraction of the product of the number of active bidders M and the con-




1−F(v)BA(x) dx. The unconditional payoﬀ EU(v,ˆ v)
will therefore be:





























M F(v)N−1−M(1 − F(v))M
Recalling that g(x,M)=M(F(x)−F(v))M−1f(x)/(1−F(v))M and observing
that v
￿ ￿ v
v M(F(x) − F(v))M−1f(x)dx = v(F(￿ v) − F(v))M, the second term
becomes, after application of the binomial theorem, v(F(￿ v)N−1−F(v)N−1).F o r
similar reasons, the third and fourth terms collapse to α(N−1)
￿ ¯ v
v BA(x)f(x)dx,
and the fourth, to (1 −α)(1 − F(v))N−1BA(￿ v), respectively, so that, collecting
terms, we have:




The partial derivative of EU(v,ˆ v) with respect to ˆ v is therefore v(N −
1)F(￿ v)N−2f(￿ v) − (1 − α)
dBA(￿ v)
d￿ v and the requirement that this derivative be












vF(v)N−2f(v)dv + k (37)








which reduces to the bid functions in Goeree et al. (2004) and Engers and
McManus (2002) in the special case where c = v =0 . For a uniform distribution









where, for the same rationale described in the sections on ﬁrst and second price
auctions, vF(v)N−1 = cA or v =( cA¯ vN−1)
1
N .
To calculate expected revenue, we observe that the expected bid for someone
chosen at random from the pool of potential participants is
￿ ¯ v
v BA(v)f(v)dv
since she does not bid when her private value is less than v(c,N) but with
"likelihood" f(v), she bids BA(v) otherwise. With N such bidders, each of


























¯ vN (¯ v −v)
where v = (cA¯ vN−1)
1
N .
7 Appendix B: Experimental Instructions and
Our Survey
Instructions
This is a sealed bid auction. You will receive no information about the bids
of the other participants and they will receive no information about your bids.
[First Price: The person who places the highest bid will receive the item and,
in turn, make a contribution to this day care center for the amount of the bid.]
[Second Price: The person who places the highest bid will receive the item and,
in turn, make a contribution to this day care center for the amount of the second
highest bid. That is, the highest bidder wins but only has to pay the second
highest bid.] [All-pay: The person who places the highest bid will receive the
i t e m .H o w e v e r ,t h i si sa nA l l - p a yA u c t i o nw h i c hm e a n st h a te v e r y o n em u s tp a y
their bids whether or not they are the highest bidder.] Bids will be accepted
until 6:30pm and we will announce the winning bids at 7:00pm. [First and
28Second Price: If you make the highest bid on an item, you must pay with cash
or write out a check to this day care center.] [All-pay: You must pay for each
bid with cash or a check made out to this preschool.] If you have to leave before
7:00pm, place bids on items and we will call you only if you make the winning
bid on an item. Please remember that all bids will go directly and entirely to
this preschool. You may direct any questions about the items being auctioned




Panasonic DVD Player (retail value: $100) 
 
Would you buy this item in a store?   Yes   No 
If Yes, what is the most you would pay for this item in a store? $___ 
How much would you bid in a similar auction not conducted for charity? $___ 
Sex of bidder:   Male   Female   Joint Decision 
 
Your Bid for this item $___ (there is no minimum bid) 
Survey
Please ﬁll in the following information about the adult members of your
family.
Schooling: Please check one box   Sex  Age  Marital 













Adult 1       
         
 
Adult 2       
         
 
Adult 3       
         
 
Adult 4       
         
 
 
Please ﬁll in the following information about the children in your family. We
are interested in how much contact your family has had, and will have, with
this preschool center.
29 
How many years has (or did) 
child attend this preschool? 
How many more years will child 
attend this preschool (include infants 
not yet enrolled)? 
Child 1     
Child 2     
Child 3     
Child 4     
Child 5     
Child 6     
 
Is your family happy with the service provided by this preschool (please
circle one)?
Very Unhappy 1 2 3 4 5 Very Happy
Is anyone in your family currently on the advisory board of this preschool?
Yes No
Has anyone in your family been on the advisory board of this preschool? Yes
No
Is anyone in your family currently employed by this preschool? Yes No
Estimate how much your family has already donated to this preschool since
January 1, 2003 (not including any donations in the auction). $___
Estimate how many total hours of service your family has donated to this
preschool since January 1, 2003? ____total hours
Town of residence:
Addison Bridport Bristol Cornwall Ferrisburgh Goshen
Granville Leicester Lincoln Middlebury Monkton New Haven
Orwell Panton Ripton Salisbury Shoreham Starksboro Sudbury
Vergennes Waltham Weybridge Whiting
How long has your family lived in this area: ____years.








(h) more than $175,000
Estimated annual charitable giving: $_________
Do you have any past experience participating in charity auctions? Yes No
Do you have any past experience participating in non-charity auctions? Yes
No
Your Phone Number (we will only use this if you need to leave before the
e n do ft h ea u c t i o na n dy o uw i na ni t e m ) :
8 Appendix C: Selection Models of Participa-
tion and Bidding
The close relationship between auction participation and bid value suggests
that bidders may not be a random sample of all auction attendees; researchers
must be aware of the potential for sample selection bias when estimating the
determinants of bid value.
To better understand how selection bias can aﬀect the analysis of bid behav-
ior, begin by letting P ∗
i,j be a latent random variable for bidder i which is some
measure of the individual’s desire to bid in auction j. Assume that P∗
i,j is a lin-
ear function of a set of non-stochastic independent variables and an error term.
These covariates include information on the auction mechanism (Aj); vectors of
demographic (Di,j) information; individual i s estimate of the total number of
bidders on item j (Ni,j); the retail price of item j and its square (Ri,j)a n da
set of interactions designed to test whether the eﬀect on bid value of expected
bidders diﬀers by auction type (Aj ×Ni,j). The participation process can then
be estimated as follows:
(C.1) P
∗
i,j = t0+t1Aj+t2Di,j+t3Ni,j+t4Ri,j+t5(Aj×Ni,j)+t6vi,j+t7αi+ i,j
where  i,j is iid ~N(0,1).
In fact, P ∗
i,j, a measure of the individual’s willingness to bid on the item, is
not observed; only the sign of P∗
i,j is known. If an individual submits a bid,
then P∗
i,j i sa s s u m e dt ob ep o s i t i v ea n dPi,j takes the value of 1. If an individual
does not submit a bid, then P ∗
i,j is assumed to be negative and we observe Pi,j
=0 .
Let Bi,j be the bid on item j submitted for individual i (observed only
when Pi,j =1 ). Assume that Bi,j is also a linear function of a set of non-
stochastic independent variables and an error term. These covariates again
include auction mechanism (Aj), demographic information (Di,j), expectations
regarding the number of other bidders (Ni,j), retail price and its square (Ri,j)
and the same set of interactions as above (Aj×Ni,j). The bid function can thus
be estimated as follows:
31(C.2) Bi,j = g0 + g1Aj + g2Di,j +g3Ni,j + g4Ri,j + g5(Aj ×Ni,j)+ni,j
where ni,j is iid ~N(0,1).
Sample selection bias arises if there exists some correlation among the errors,
 i,j and ni,j in equations (A.1)a n d( A.2). For example, if we assume that
( i,j,n i,j)~ b i v a r i a t en o r m a l( 0,0,1,σ ,ρ)t h e nρ is a measure of the correlation
among the errors. The correlation between the two errors will be positive,
if the unobserved determinant increases both the probability of participation
and bid value. Furthermore, the conditional mean bid will be higher than the
unconditional mean bid if ρ is positive, and lower if ρ is negative. If correction is
not made, then the estimates of the coeﬃcients in equation (A.2) will be biased
and inconsistent.
The Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) is the appropriate empirical
tool in this situation; it corrects for the fact that the sample of individuals who
submit bids may be systematically diﬀerent from those who do not and allow us
to use information from non-bidders to obtain consistent parameter estimates of
the determinants of bid value. In order to identify the selection equation, we use
an indicator for ‘employee or board member’ (rather than relying on functional
form assumptions). Employees and board members (i.e., event organizers) are
likely to face external pressure to participate in the auction since participation
is publicly observed. However, since bids are sealed, employee or board member
status should have no additional impact on bids conﬁdentially submitted.
Table C reports the Heckman results. Model (1), the basic speciﬁcation,
includes information on auction-type, expected number of bidders, retail value,
and demographic characteristics of bidders. Model (2) adds interactions be-
tween auction-type and expected number of bidders. The most extensive speci-
ﬁcation, Model (3), includes all covariates in Models (1) and (2) but adds infor-
mation on reported private values. The ﬁrst two models suggest that selection
matters (i.e., the inverse Mill’s ratios are weakly signiﬁcant); bid functions esti-
mated only on participants are subject to sample selection bias. However, once
we include reported private values (Model (3)), the inverse Mill’s ratio becomes
insigniﬁcant and ρ falls from .42 to .09. The key implication is that if private
values are known (or induced in the lab), the Heckman selection model is no
longer necessary and auction participation and bid behavior can be estimated
independently. However, ﬁeld experiments that fail to survey individuals about
private values are susceptible to selection bias in their bid estimates.
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10 Tables and Figures
First Price Second Price All-Pay(1) All-Pay(2)
Item Type Retail Value Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Deli Gift Certificate $10 $15 $10 $0 $11
Children's Science Book Book $13 $15 $15 $1 $0
Bakery Tart $15 $16 $20 $62 $27
Chocolate Making Kit Craft $15 $15 $10 $0 $1
Craft/Toy Store Gift Certificate $20 $35 $25 $20 $5
Cadoo Cranium Game $20 $20 $15 $10 $6
Sports/Clothing Store Gift Certificate $25 $30 $30 $52 $13
Pizzeria Gift Certificate $30 $50 $20 $5 $0
Kitchen Store Gift Certificate $40 $40 $50 $110 $13
Garden Item Spruce Tree $40 $30 $45 $25 $0
Pewter Item Picture Frame $42 $25 $45 $30 $19
Restaurant (a) Gift Certificate $50 $75 $65 $104 $58
Wooden Train Tracks Toy $50 $30 $75 $0 $46
Performing Arts Tickets $60 $75 $75 $55 $25
Auto Detailing Gift Certificate $75 $100 $100 $32 $26
Restaurant (b) Gift Certificate $75 $125 $100 $88 $40
American Girl Doll Collectible $100 $90 $75 $65 $153
DVD Player Electronics $100 $75 $100 $10 $120
Day Spa Gift Certificate $200 $165 $100 $100 $54
TV/Video Player for Auto Electronics $275 $200 $110 $135 $40
Totals $1,255 $1,226 $825 $904 $656
Table 1: Auctioned Items and Revenues
34Variables First Price Second Price All-Pay (1) All-Pay (2)
Number of Potential Bidders 31 30 15 21
Average Participation Rate 53% 39% 13% 14%
Total revenue $1,226 $825 $904 $656
Revenue (dollars) $61.3(52.64) $41.25(25.89) $45.2(42.92) $32.8(40.24)
Proportion of Items Efficiently Allocated .5(.51) .3(.47) .6(.50) .4(.50)
Average Retail Value of Items $62.75 (65.17) $62.75 (65.17) $62.75 (65.17) $62.75 (65.17)
Average Bid (including zeros) $13.53 (22.80) $10.04 (18.76) $3.72 (13.48) $1.64 (6.14)
Average Bid (no zeros) $25.42 (25.98) $25.53 (22.36) $24.43(26.50) $11.51(12.38)
Average Expected Bidders per Item 23.56 (24.58) 18.33 (13.28) 8.04 (5.49) 17.31 (15.74)
Proportion of missing Expectations .23 (.42) .12 (.33) .35 (.48) .33 (.47)
Proportion of Bids Submitted by Male .24 (.42) .11 (.31) .16 (.37) .20(.40)
Proportion of Bids Submitted by Female .71(.45) .66 (.48) .74 (.44) .75 (.43)
Proportion of Bids Submitted Jointly .05 (.22) .22 (.41) .08 (.28) 0 (0)
Proportion with HH Income < $75000 .42 (.50) .43 (.50) .73(.46) .38(.50)
Proportion with $75000<=HH Income < =$125000 .29 (.46) .37 (.49) .20(.41) .33(.48)
Proportion with HH Income > $75000 .16 (.37) .17 (.38) .07(.26) .24(.44)
Proportion with Missing Income .13 (.34) .03 (.18) 0(0) .05 (.22)
Average Preschool Donations (last 6 mos) $50.40(112.96) $116.11(177.85) $34.23(61.44) $73.67(189.40)
Average Future Child-Years at Preschool .87(1.12) 1.63(1.36) .63(1.25) 1.05(1.28)
Proportion who are Employees or Board Members .29(.46) .40 (.50) .53 (.52) .33 (.48)
Note: (Standard Deviations)
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Auction
35(1) (2)
All-Pay (Beta1) 2.565 36.166
[7.416] [21.526]
First Price (Beta2) 18.695 38.283
[1.611]*** [9.567]**
Average Expected Bidders (Beta3) 0.257 0.83
[0.305] [0.649]
Retail Value 0.935 0.893
[0.248]** [0.154]**
Retail Value Squared -0.002 -0.002
[0.001] [0.001]*
All-pay*Average Expected Bidders (Beta4) -2.41
[0.937]*
First Price*Average Expected Bidders (Beta5) -1.046
[0.203]**
Average Preschool Donations -0.02
[0.057]
Proportion of Employees or Board Members -2.343
[6.260]
Proportion of Bidders who are Female -2.519
[5.439]
Proportion with HH Income <$75,000/year -36.223
[18.307]
Average Future Child-Years 11.99
[2.343]**
Average Reported Private Value 0.441
[0.375]




Note: Robust standard errors corrected for non-independence within auctions in
brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.




First Price 0.315 0.335
[0.033]*** [0.025]***
Average Expected Bidders -0.021 -0.027
[0.007]*** [0.006]***
Retail Value 0.002 0.0001
[0.004] [0.004]




Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.14
Table 4: Probit Analysis of Efficiency by Item
Note: Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors corrected for
non-independence within auction in brackets. * significant at 10%;




First Price 0.132 0.255
[0.060]** [0.074]***
Expected Number of Bidders 0.005 0.010
[0.002]*** [0.002]***
Expected Number of Bidders Missing 0.021 0.024
[0.073] [0.071]
Retail Value 0.001 0.001
[0.0007] [0.001]




HH Income < $75000 -0.109 -0.095
[0.052]** [0.054]*
$75000<=HH Income < =$125000 -0.083 -0.070
[0.056] [0.056]
Missing Income 0.025 0.049
[0.082] [0.083]
Future Child-Years at Preschool 0.012 0.009
[0.017] [0.017]
Preschool Donations (last 6 mos) -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]** [0.0001]**
Employee or Board Member 0.205 0.213
[0.054]*** [0.055]***
Reported Private Value 0.002 0.002
[0.0005]*** [0.0005]***
No Private Value Reported -0.218 -0.222
[0.049]*** [0.048]***
All-Pay*Expected Number of Bidders -0.006
[0.003]**
First Price*Expected Number of Bidders -0.007
[0.003]**
Observations 1840 1840
Wald Chi-squared, p-value 169, <0.01 188, <0.01
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.20
Note: Marginal effects reported.  Robust standard errors corrected for non-independence 
within bidders in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Table 5: Probit Estimation of the Determinants of Participation
38(1) (2)
All-Pay (Tau1) -12.604 -5.305
[4.247]*** [4.971]
First Price (Tau2) 0.867 5.566
[3.054] [3.577]
Expected Number of Bidders (Tau3) 0.012 0.229
[0.047] [0.106]**
Expected Number of Bidders Missing 3.452 3.588
[3.967] [3.879]
Retail Value 0.407 0.412
[0.054]*** [0.054]***




HH Income < $75000 -9.978 -9.210
[3.440]*** [3.252]***
$75000<=HH Income < =$125000 -5.896 -5.591
[3.544]* [3.420]
Missing Income 0.389 1.436
[5.711] [5.730]
Future Child-Years at Preschool -0.045 -0.213
[1.097] [1.089]
Preschool Donations (last 6 mos) 0.028 0.028
[0.016]* [0.016]*
Reported Private Value (Tau6) 0.213 0.208
[0.057]*** [0.057]***
No Private Value Reported 6.921 6.546
[4.981] [5.004]
All-Pay*Expected Number of Bidders (Tau4) -0.421
[0.132]***
First Price*Expected Number of Bidders (Tau5) -0.233
[0.105]**
Constant (Tau0) 8.508 3.153
[4.277]** [4.590]
Observations 648 648
F statistic, p-value 17, <0.01 16, <0.01
R-squared 0.47 0.48
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Analysis of Bids (among auction participants)
Note: Robust standard errors corrected for non-independence within bidders in 
brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
39Participation Bid Participation Bid Participation Bid
All-Pay -0.239 -17.559 -0.169 -8.396 -0.149 -6.003
[0.026]*** [3.705]*** [0.039]*** [4.133]** [0.040]*** [3.779]
First Price 0.138 1.954 0.254 8.873 0.255 6.114
[0.030]*** [1.982] [0.043]*** [3.267]*** [0.044]*** [3.001]**
Expected Number of Bidders 0.006 0.078 0.010 0.398 0.010 0.250
[0.001]*** [0.046]* [0.001]*** [0.116]*** [0.001]*** [0.106]**
Expected Number of Bidders Missing -0.099 3.335 -0.098 3.580 0.024 3.568
[0.032]*** [2.859] [0.032]*** [2.781] [0.041] [2.444]
Retail Value 0.002 0.507 0.002 0.512 0.001 0.415
[0.001]*** [0.044]*** [0.001]*** [0.044]*** [0.001]* [0.041]***
Retail Value Squared -0.000007 -0.001 -0.000007 -0.001 -0.000006 -0.001
[0.000]*** [0.0002]*** [0.000]*** [0.0002]*** [0.000]*** [0.0001]***
Female 0.108 -1.832 0.121 -1.025 0.126 -3.077
[0.024]*** [1.858] [0.024]*** [1.895] [0.024]*** [1.786]*
HH Income < $75000 -0.083 -11.966 -0.071 -10.890 -0.095 -9.451
[0.032]*** [2.249]*** [0.033]** [2.222]*** [0.034]*** [2.106]***
$75000<=HH Income < =$125000 -0.066 -8.076 -0.053 -7.517 -0.070 -5.931
[0.034]** [2.549]*** [0.035] [2.486]*** [0.035]** [2.352]***
Missing Income 0.041 2.440 0.064 3.849 0.049 1.444
[0.056] [3.185] [0.057] [3.184] [0.058] [2.947]
Future Child-Years at Preschool 0.016 -0.099 0.014 -0.343 0.009 -0.243
[0.010] [0.635] [0.010] [0.636] [0.010] [0.594]
Preschool Donations (last 6 mos) -0.0003 0.030 -0.0003 0.030 -0.0003 0.028
[0.0001]*** [0.005]*** [0.0001]*** [0.005]*** [0.0001]*** [0.005]***
Employee or Board Member 0.197 0.206 0.213
[0.028]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]***
All-Pay*Expected Number of Bidders -0.005 -525 -0.006 -0.432
[0.002]** [0.150]*** [0.002]*** [0.141]***
First Price*Expected Number of Bidders -0.007 -0.355 -0.007 -0.250
[0.002]*** [0.116]*** [0.002]*** [0.107]**
Reported Private Value 0.002 0.212
[0.0004]*** [0.026]***
No Private Value Reported -0.222 5.717
[0.029]*** [3.832]
Lambda (inverse Mills Ratio), p-value
rho
Observations 1840 1192 1840 1192 1840 1192
Wald Chi-squared, p-value
Note: Marginal effects reported.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
8.158, 0.095 8.164, 0.092 1.546, 0.731
732, <0.01 761, <0.01 926, <0.01
Table C: Heckman Models of Bid Selection
0.416 0.420 0.089
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Figure 1: Bids and Revenues in the First Price Auction with Participation Costs
(a) Bids versus v and N (b) Revenues versus v and N
Figure 2: Bids and Revenues in the Second Price Auction with Participation Costs
(a) Bids versus v and N (b) Revenues versus v and N
Figure 3: Bids and Revenues in the All-pay Auction with Participation Costs
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